*** MILITARY SITUATION ***
Considering Russia's problem with manpower availability and the question of mobilization. Its unclear how they can sustain the war without making difficult political choices (and even with). However, general mobilization is the wrong issue to focus on.
First, I'll briefly restate the Russian manpower problem. After taking significant losses in the first phase of the war, the Russian military has scrounged the active force for reinforcements, and is largely tapped out in terms of manpower availability. The reason for this is that the Russian military operates on tiered readiness, with units at 90-70% manning levels. Many towards that 70% mark. In the event of a large war the military assumed manning levels would be raised & conscripts could be deployed.
The force could produce on short notice 2x BTGs from brigades and regiments, the rest was a conscript mix, and units were not fully manned. The available standing force has already been deployed into this war with a number of BTGs out of action due to casualties. However, without declaring a state of war, or conducting partial mobilization the force is still operating at peacetime strength. Below is one estimate of how a hypothetical brigade with 3,500 personnel may have only a fraction actually available for deployment.
While its true that general mobilization won't solve Russia's woes in this conflict, and that in practice it may not even be feasible, the Russian military does not need general mobilization to sustain combat operations, and address its immediate manpower shortage.
The first issue is the status of Putin's 'special operation.' Russia has to either declare a state of war, or procedurally change the rules prohibiting deployment of conscripts, and the state's ability to mobilize additional personnel. As it stands, contract servicemen can try to break their contracts & refuse to deploy. Conscripts are being drafted and demobilized on schedule, and units technically can't deploy them even though some cheated early in the war and sent mixed conscript formations.
The fastest way for Putin to alter these constraints is also politically the most unpalatable: declare a state of war. It's clear that for a host of reasons this is something he doesn't want to do. However, the Russian military effort is also unsustainable as is. The current Russian approach appears to be halfway measures to muddle through. The Russian military has been trying to raise manning levels behind the scenes by offer short term contracts, a few months as opposed to years, and high payouts up to 200-220k RUB per month. Other steps include enticing reservists to accept contracts, and pressuring conscripts into changing their status, converting them to contract service so that they can be deployed. All of that will get harder as word of casualties and the state of things on the front spreads.
If we consider those who were recently demobilized or just got out of several years contract service, Russia could potentially have access to a significant amount of additional manpower. Right now about 130k+ conscripts with 1 year of service are being demobilized. I'm skeptical of arguments that these are untrained, or inherently poor quality. It depends. Skills are perishable, but the pool with recent mil experience & training is far from small.
If we consider just manpower requirements to replace losses and allow troop rotation to sustain the war then the Russian military does not need hundreds of thousands of troops. This assumes limited war aims, and a lower loss rate than the first month of the war. Generating additional battalions will take time and probably wont prove relevant to the offensive in the Donbas, but my point here is that there are things the Russian leadership could try in between ordering general mobilization and doing nothing.
There's a lot we don't know about the Russian capacity to train and take in additional personnel right now. How many units pulled in officers/contract servicemen need for training to fill out their BTGs and replace losses. Its probably a very uneven situation.
It is quite possible that eventually Moscow will be forced to conduct what constitutes a partial mobilization, whether declared or undeclared. Taken together with changes to laws/regulations, this could provide enough manpower over time to drag the war out.
As it stands, Russian options are shrinking. The more they drag their feet the further their ability to sustain the war deteriorates, and the worse their subsequent options.
On Feb 27, the fourth day of the war, the Russians sent at least two light detachments into the city of Kharkov, probably to gauge resistance. At least one of the groups got shot up, and retreated with the loss of its vehicles. After this, the Russians never again attempted to enter Kharkov either with screening forces or in force. They were content to sit on the city’s northern and eastern approaches and transferred units away from this sector. This is to say the Russians had never regarded Kharkov as a priority, not the least because they understood taking it would require and tie up enormous resources.
Sitting on the outskirts of Ukraine’s second-largest city and threatening it, however, was useful as it tied down Ukrainian forces. Including new forces being generated in the city itself. Especially since, due to the proximity of Russia, this was relatively easy to do, and did not require an overstretched or herculean Russian effort.
Thus as the Russians at the end of March retreated from the outskirts of Kiev, Chernigov, and Sumy, no such Russian retreat occurred at Kharkov. This largely static situation persisted until early May when offensive action returned — this time conducted by the Ukrainians. On May 4 Ukrainians attacked and in the next few days captured a number of settlements, including Stari Saltiv with its crossing over the Northern Donets river. This partially cut off the Russia-led forces at Kharkov from the main body of the Russian side to the east of the river.
After a brief lull of a few days, Ukrainian gains resumed. Russia gradually fell back to within just 10 kilometers of the Russian border all along the front, and in one place Ukraine actually reached the Russian state border.
During this second stage of the battle, the exposed Russians withdrew from some settlements voluntarily ahead of the Ukrainians, while many others were wrestled from them by force. Ukraine was actually advancing faster at Kharkov (albeit on a narrower front) than Russia was able to during the same time in Donbass. It is true that both sides understand that Kharkov is the side show to the main battle, so this was nonetheless no major Ukrainian victory.
However at the same time apparently the Russia forces seemingly failed to offer the same kind of dogged resistance offered by the Ukrainians entrenched in Donbass who are fighting for every meter and won’t abandon a settlement until it has been reduced to rubble many times over. Also we have little evidence that Russian was able to leverage the fact Ukrainians were attacking and on the move, to inflict grievous losses with its artillery or air force. (This is perhaps worrying from the Russian POV. The common wisdom has been that Russian firepower would exact a heavy price on the Ukrainians whenever they left prepared positions and had to mass for a counter-offensive.) With the Russians pushed back from Kharkov outskirts the Ukrainians might be able to divert more resources away from their second city. Most likely to spoiling attacks into the flank of the Russians attempting to break out from Izyum bridgehead. Also, should the Russians ever wish to blockade Kharkov they will have to bleed for the same settlements yet again.
Theoretically the new gains allow the Ukrainians to shell the Russian city of Belgorod, but this would require deploying heavy artillery to the very front line and is thus unlikely.
The reason the Ukrainians were able to conduct a successful offensive here is very simple. It is because around Kharkov the Russians are outnumbered.
The Russians stripped their flanks to the benefit of their Donbass effort, leaving them outnumbered against the constantly reinforcing Ukrainians.
The reason they had to do this is because of the severe shortage of manpower in general. They already lack the correlation of forces in Donbass for swift and dramatic success. Without having left their northern flank at Kharkov, and the southern one at Kherson outnumbered 2 to 1, their punching power in Donbass would be even less. Actually many of the troops on the Russian side were fighters from Lugansk, and not even Lugansk regulars, but their newly-mobilized conscripts. Moreover the Lugansk guys lacked anti-tank weapons. So not only were the Russian-led forces at Kharkov outnumbered, but also their quality left much to be desired. As said, this is a secondary theater, and so it can not be said that Russia suffered a major defeat. However, the state of its flanks and that Ukrainians were able to pull this off puts lie to a claim that Russia has enough troops committed for the task. When you’re having to patch up your lines with second-rate Lugansk reservists and leave them to face a twice stronger enemy then you simply can not claim to have all the men you need. It is abundant proof of exactly the opposite.
It’s almost as if fighting a major war at 50% manning, including because you left serving conscripts at home, isn’t a good idea. It’s incredible that a 145 million Russia with a 1-million military should be outnumbered on any section of the front, its troops left to face 2 to 1 odds, but that’s where we are.
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-Russian occupation authorities announced plans to destroy the Azovstal Steel Plant and turn Mariupol into a resort city, depriving Russia of some of the most important economic benefits it hoped to reap by taking the city in the first place. Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Denis Pushilin stated that DNR authorities are planning to level Azovstal after completing its capture. Azovstal was a major element of Mariupol’s economy before the war because of its unique function as a full-cycle metallurgical complex, the 10,000 jobs associated with production at the plant, the billions of dollars of foreign exchange earnings and taxes it generated, and its production output of 7,000 tons of steel, 6 million tons of iron, and 4.5 million tons of rolled metal, according to the Mariupol City Council. Pushilin stated that the DNR intends to rebuild Mariupol to be a “resort city,” while admitting that 60% of the structures in Mariupol have been destroyed to the point where they cannot be rebuilt. The announced plan to turn Mariupol into a center of tourism and leisure following the complete destruction of a major center of economic activity in Mariupol, is indicative of the damage that Russian troops have inflicted on themselves through the destruction of Mariupol. Russia does not need another resort town on the Black Sea. It does need the kind of hard currency that a plant like Azovstal had generated. This announcement epitomizes the kind of Pyrrhic victories Russian forces have won in Ukraine, to the extent that they have won victories at all.
The Kremlin may hope to offset the loss of revenues from Azovstal and other destroyed infrastructure in Ukraine by profiting from the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant that is forces have seized. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin announced that he will allocate maximum integration assistance for Zaporizhia Oblast to work in a “friendly Russian family” during his visit to Melitopol on May 18. Khusnullin added that the Zaporihia Nuclear Power Plant will exclusively work for Russia and will sell electricity to Ukraine. This statement is a clear Russian recognition that there will be an independent Ukraine at the end of this war and that Russia seeks to restore its energy leverage over Ukraine and possibly the West more broadly that has been reduced by sanctions and efforts to reduce reliance on Russian energy. It also reinforces the urgency of helping Ukraine regain control of Enerhodar City and the rest of its occupied territory to forestall this renewed economic thralldom. ISW previously reported that Russian forces started digging trenches and blocking highways to Enerhodar City. The Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian occupation authorities continued to prepare for a referendum in Enerhodar City on May 18.
-Ukrainian officials reported protests in Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) over forced mobilizations on May 16-17. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that relatives of the forcefully mobilized LNR servicemen demanded an immediate return of their family members from combat in Luhansk City and Rovenky approximately 50 kilometers west of Russian border. The GUR noted that perceptions of war and resentment of mobilization in LNR worsened because of the high casualties Russian forces have suffered and the fact that Russian authorities are reportedly evading payments to the families of wounded and killed servicemen. Mariupol Mayor’s Advisor Petro Andryushenko had previously reported that a protest against mobilization had occurred in Donetsk City on May 16.
-A strike on a Ukrainian battery of 155 mm M777 howitzers made in the USA was recorded. The footage shows the village of Podgornoye, DPR. In just one day, rocket troops and artillery of the Russian Armed Forces hit 76 nationalist command posts, 421 enemy manpower and military equipment.
Caught by the Russians as they were setting up. Targeted by a Zala kamikaze drone, then a follow-on strike by rocket artillery as they seek shelter in a nearby forest.
