*** MILITARY SITUATION ***
Analyzing Breakthrough Operations in the Donbas.
A closer look at the state of operations along the line of operations ranging from Izium to Popasna in east Ukraine to gain a better understanding of what it will take to achieve a decisive breakthrough. A brief analysis of what seems to be the overall direction of operations by the Russian military in what is clearly the decisive terrain in east Ukraine – the convex line running from Izium through Siverskyi Donets to the Severondontsk Salient.
This portion of the Donbas front is the key to ultimate victory or defeat in the east. There has been a lot of discussion lately, both online and in the media, of the trajectory of Russian operations and what they may accomplish. May 9 is seen as an important waypoint for Russia, whether this is an actual deadline is debatable.
Let us look at the balance of forces currently engaged in the Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD & their likely mission set.
The most recent geolocation data places at least 60x BTGs in the Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD. 51x BTGs are arrayed from Izium to Popsana.
Of the known Ukrainian forces in the Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD, pre-war tables of organization allocate 61x Maneuver Battalions & 20x Territorial Defense Battalions in the Donbas. 37x Maneuver & all 20x Territorial Defense Battalions are currently arrayed from Izium to Popsana. The number of Ukrainian BNs have likely changed due to attrition. However, these numbers give us a picture of the balance of forces.
Russia has struggled, and continues to struggle, with properly resourcing & sustaining their war effort, but the Russian military clearly sees the Severodonetsk-Donetsk OD, in particular the Siverskyi Donets line, as decisive terrain to control. To do this Russia has to accomplish the integration & synchronization of the preponderance of their forces in time & space through strategic movement, successively, upon decisive points & key points of communication without compromising their own.
Here is a model of what this would look like. Key to successfully obtaining integration & synchronization of mass in time & space is the ability to arrange forces & combat multipliers (aviation, artillery, cyber, ADA, engineers, etc.) at the proper time with ample energy.
This last part is the crucial element of combined arms maneuver. Here is the same graphic but arrayed with what I surmise is the Russian operational plan. April 24 is my mark on the wall for when general large-scale offensive operations began in earnest in the Donbas.
Using May 9 as a key date for the Kremlin to declare some sort of “victory”, Russian forces only had 16 days to reach their operational objectives. As you can see, if May 9 is indeed a mark on the wall to measure Russian success, they are way behind the power curve. It is not likely at this point for Russia to achieve some sort of positive or negative breakthrough by May 9, if this is indeed a key date in Russian operational planning. Still Russia is gaining ground through slow incremental advances.
Russian forces have marginally improved at conducting large-scale operations with forces moving along mutually supporting routes of advance, employing for effective recon by force techniques to engage & maneuver against Ukrainian defenses supported by air & artillery. Though poor morale, logistical issues, manpower shortages, poor leadership still plague Russian operations, the immediate obstacle to their success is the Ukrainian military & resolve. This more than anything else, is what is slowing Russian progress.
Ukraine has reinforced and fortified prepared defensive positions. These points are capable of withstanding prolonged air & artillery strikes. With excellent morale and leadership, it will be difficult for Russian forces to breach their defenses. Video showing Russian artillery strikes on a Ukrainian defensive position in Donetsk. The position looks well-fortified and the soldiers are likely underground.
Here is a look at division opposed rates of advance against fortified, prepared, and hasty defenses based on historical combat data. As you can see, historical daily advance rates for mechanized forces against intense resistance is slow.
Let us now look at a variant of the space/time/mass maneuver model. This is aligned with a traditional Russian doctrinal template advancing along multiple axes to split defenders into separate or isolated groups to be destroyed in detail while striking deep into secure areas.
Again, if May 9 is/was a target date for Russian forces in this OD, they should uniformly at or approaching the 20km line indicated in this graphic. Russian forces are not near this point. The grueling pace of Russian daily advances are consistent with HERO historical data.
Here is one more data point to support this:
Even though the QJM shows Russia has an advantage in combat power and should be able to achieve a breakthrough there is a lot working against this effort. As noted at the top of this thread the Ukrainians have a greater number of maneuver BNs to blunt advances. Still we could see a situation that ends up like this by late May/early June if Russian forces are able to continue to make incremental progress. This would be the best situation the Russians could hope for now. Reaching this point will culminate what force they have left.
The Summer may see a long-drawn-out siege of the urban cluster ranging from Kramatorsk to Lysychansk. Either way there is still a lot of bloody hard fighting to go before either side has a definitive battlefield advantage in the Donbas.
Looking at the battlefield operations up close looks very dauting from a Ukrainian perspective.
It could be a long summer.
-Ukrainian defenses have largely stalled Russian advances in Eastern Ukraine. Russian troops conducted a number of unsuccessful attacks in Eastern Ukraine on May 4 and were unable to make any confirmed advances. Russian forces attacking south of Izyum appear increasingly unlikely to successfully encircle Ukrainian forces in the Rubizhne area. Ukrainian forces have so far prevented Russian forces from merging their offensives to the southeast of Izyum and the west of Lyman, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk, as Russian forces likely intended.
-Russian forces reportedly entered the Azovstal Steel Plant – rather than its outskirts – for the first time on May 4. The extent of this Russian advance remains unclear, and Russian forces likely face further costly fighting if they intend to clear the entire facility. The Kremlin likely hopes that the successful capture of Azovstal through a ground assault will cement the Kremlin’s growing effort to claim complete control of Mariupol by May 9, with Russian propagandists recently arriving in the city to set conditions for further claims of a Russian victory. The Kremlin likely intends to claim some sort of victory in Mariupol to present a success to the Russian people, though Russian forces are highly unlikely to halt offensive operations across Ukraine on this date.
-Russian forces intensified airstrikes against transportation infrastructure in Western Ukraine on May 4 but remain unable to interdict Western aid shipments to Ukraine. Six Russian cruise missiles hit electrical substations near railway stations in Lviv and Transcarpathia (the southwestern Oblast of Ukraine) on May 4. A senior US defense official reported that Russian aircraft conducted 200 to 300 airstrikes largely targeting transportation infrastructure in the last 24 hours. The US official added that these Russian strikes are likely intended disrupt Ukrainian transportation capabilities and slow down weapon re-supply efforts but have been unable to do so.
-A significant Ukrainian counter offensive has pushed Russian forces roughly 40km east of the city of Kharkiv, the institute for the study of war has said in its latest intelligence report. The counter offensive could set conditions for a broader operation to drive the Russians from most of their positions around the city, the organisation added.
-Ukraine Passes Law Making 100,000 Territorial Defense Militias Deployable Across Country
1. It means that Ukraine has broken its words to its Territorial volunteers that they wouldn’t be sent to fight outside their regions. The Soviet Union did the same to its Opolchenie militias in 1942 who were eventually pressed into the Red Army and Imperial Russia partially did the same to Opolchenie in 1812.
2. It means that Territorial Defense can not become a safe haven for shirkers. Until now there was a theoretical path where volunteering for the Territoral Defense kept you safe from the front and from conscription at the same time.
3. It means that at a swoop Ukraine gains over 100,000 fighters it can deploy anywhere in the country. These are just light infantry formations without organic artillery backing except for mortars. Nonetheless, they can be useful if placed into cities or if paired with heavier units.
4. Mostly it shows Ukraine’s resolve to do everything it takes to win this war, or come as close to winning as possible.
Russia truly hates the humble Zatoka bridge. It has now hit it *for the third time*, supposedly severing it. This leaves Ukraine’s Budjak region technically cut off from Ukraine (except through Moldova). More importantly, it severs a railway by which Ukraine was importing a lot of fuel via Romania. However, despite the persistent bullying of the poor Zatoka bridge, Russia still ignores the even more strategic bridges over the Dnieper. Why the discrimination? Some bridges’ lives matter apparently. Instead Russia has hit railways in western Ukraine once again, specifically the electrification infrastructure (once again).