Projected New Russian Operational PLAN

 

Given the operational realities Russia is faced with (i.e., limited manpower, poor morale, fragmented command & control, substandard maintenance, inexperienced leaders, etc.) it’s military can only reasonably focus offensive operations in one area.

It is assessed the primary battle zone for Russian forces will be in north central Donetsk. Located here is the Donets River Line, Severodonetsk Salient, and former Line of Contact running SE to SW from Popasna to Donetsk along with 7x Ukrainian maneuver brigades. This area also constitutes one of the most fortified areas of east Ukraine. Russian attempts to break through the Ukrainian LOC over nearly two months of combat have proven unsuccessful. It is likely that Russian forces now massing near Izium will attempt to outflank the line.

Russian forces will advance on Slovyansk, but this will more than likely be meant as a feint to fix Ukrainian maneuver brigades along in the Severodonetsk Salient. It is more likely that Russian forces will seize the decisive geographic point of Barvinkove & then push SW. The objective of this drive will most likely be decisive geographic point of Pokrovsk which is 79 km NW of Donetsk. The goal is likely to control the main highway from Barvinkove to Pokrovsk & create a cauldron out of north central & NE Donetsk.

The Russian concept of a cauldron is a very large strategic-level concentration of trapped enemy forces. In the cauldron, Ukrainian forces would be contained but not directly engaged. Russian VKS, artillery, and other stand-off weapons would reduce Ukrainian resistance. The Russians could close the cauldron or leave an opening to encourage Ukrainian troops to flee through, either way Russian forces would be able to clear the most fortified region of Donetsk without having to physically push Ukraine forces out of their positions (in theory). The Russians used this approach during the Battle of Debaltseve (14 January – 20 February 2015), forcing Ukrainian units to retreat from a key portion of the LOC. Success of this smaller cauldron allowed Russia to gain a more favorable negotiating position for Minsk II.

The second battle zone would be around Kherson. Here we would expect to see priority of forces and resources behind those sent to the Donetsk battle zone to maintain control of this decisive strategic point. A point necessary for a favorable negotiation position.  Kharkiv remains the principal disruption zone. Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix a substantial portion of Ukrainian mechanized forces, denying their involvement for operations in Donetsk.

A second disruption zone will center near the northern border of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Like Kharkiv Limited ground assaults and continued air/artillery/missile strikes will fix several maneuver brigades from counterattacks in Donetsk.

A potential third disruption zone is Kyiv itself. Although it is unknown if Russia intends to continue any sort of offensive action against the Ukrainian capital, air & missile strikes have the potential to divert critical resources away from east Ukraine.