Jomini of the West's current assessment of Russian operational goals, reflecting the current idea that Russia will ultimately partition the country roughly along the Dnieper river.
1/ Russo-Ukrainian War, 2022: Here is my current assessment of Russia’s probable war aims in Ukraine, stated strategic goals to achieve those aims, and the principal military objectives of the Russian forces to set conditions for victory
2/ Russia more than likely seeks an end-state in which a new Ukrainian government will be politically aligned with the Kremlin, militarily neutral and dependent on Russia for its defense, economically integrated into the EAEU, and has conditional transparent borders.
3/ In Putin’s 22 Feb 2022 press-conference he stated the following goals to achieve a new peace. a) Ukraine recognizes Crimean annexation; b) Ukraine rejects NATO membership; c) Ukraine “demilitarizes”; d) Ukraine recognize DPR & LPR as independent with 2014 borders.
4/ With these points in mind three key questions need to be addressed from the Russian point of view.
5/ First, what military conditions much be produced to achieve the strategic goals? Second, what is sequence of actions is most likely to produce these conditions? Finally, how should forces and resources be arrayed to accomplish that sequence of actions?
6/ The key obstacle that must be overcome in identifying solutions to these questions is how best to integrate and synchronize available forces and resources (force-mass) in time and space throughout an extended and multi-dimensional theater of war toward specific aims.
7/ An initial analysis of Russia’s “Special Military Operation” provides insights into how the Russian Armed Forces have designed this campaign to direct force-mass in time and space to achieve Putin’s stated goals.
8/ West OSK has 53-57 BTGs (50% of allocated BTGs) to seize Kyiv to cause a Ukrainian Government collapse, and clear and control Kharkiv to isolate the Donbas and allow for advance on the Dnieper.
9/ Kyiv is Ukraine’s primary decisive strategic point, that is a point capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or a single enterprise. Capturing Kyiv will allow the Russians to install a new government with which it can “negotiate” with.
10/ By controlling Kharkiv the Russians open multiple avenues of advance toward the geostrategic point of Dnipro (a critical military and communications hub). From Kharkiv they can pivot operationally east to isolate the Donbas and west to capture Dnieper crossings.
11/ South OSK has 30-35 BTGs (30% of allocated BTGs) and an estimated 34,000 Separatists to fix Ukrainian forces along the Donbas line of contact to allow for their envelopment by the 1st GTA, and to seize the Black Sea coast to secure Crimea & deny its resources to Ukraine.
12/ Advancing to the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast borders will achieve the stated political objective point of securing the territorial integrity of the Separatist region. The Ukrainians will more than likely not have the military resources to eject the Russians from the Donbas.
13/ Clearing the Black Sea coastline will secure Russia’s claim to the Crimea. Likewise, it will facilitate the envelopment of Ukrainian forces in the Donbas from the southwest and enable achieving the aim of a Russian advance to the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast borders.
14/ An additional benefit of controlling southern Ukraine and the Black Sea coastline is denying the Ukrainian government access to the vital economic resources of the region to sustain a prolonged national resistance.
15/ An additional 23 BTGs (20% of allocated BTGs) remain in Belarus and near the Ukrainian border in Russia, most likely as a strategic reserve. These forces are most likely allocated first to reinforce the northern theater of operations from Kyiv to Sumy in the east.
16/ The likely Russian limit of advance is concurrently its second political objective, the line of the Dnieper River. Occupation eastern Ukraine answers the operational dilemmas indicated in thread 5 above. It places Russia in the strongest position to dictate terms.
17/ Russian operations appear to be sequenced to first seize Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson; second to take Mariupol, Dnipro, and Poltava; Third to advance to the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast borders and Dnieper River.
18/ What is unknown is the timeline they expect to achieve the third sequence of actions.
19/ Geographic Strategic Point – A point of the theater of war that is of military importance, whether from its position as a center of communication, presence of military or government establishment, or fortifications. All strategic points are not necessarily decisive.
20/ Decisive Strategic Point – A point that can exercise a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise.
21/ Decisive Geographic Point – Those points the possession of would give a military force the control of critical lines of communications.
23/ Pivot of Operations – A material point of both strategic and tactical importance, serves as a point of support and endures throughout a campaign.
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